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THE NEWSMAN'S PRIVILEGE AND THE
CONSTITUTION
In doing my work, I (and those who assist me) depend
constantly on information, ideas, leads, and opinions received in
confidence. Such material is essential in digging out newsworthy
facts and, equally important, in assessing the importance and
analyzing the significance of public events. Without such
materials, I would be able to do little more than broadcast press
releases and public statements.*
I. INTRODUCTION
It has long been recognized that a free press plays a central role in
helping to maintain the other institutions and attitudes of a free society.
The Supreme Court has said "It]he free press had been a mighty
catalyst in awakening public interest in governmental affairs, exposing
corruption among public officers and employees and generally
informing the citizenry of public events and occurrences ....
In order to fulfill this mandate, "confidential relationships ...
are commonly developed and maintained by professional journalists,
and are indispensible to their work of gathering, and analyzing and
publishing the news."'2 These facts are more vividly shown in affidavits
filed by newsmen of national stature, such as Walter Cronkite, J.
Anthony Lucas, Eric Sevareid, Mike Wallace, among others, which
indicate that confidential communications to newsmen are
indispensable to their gathering, analysis and dissemination of the
news; that the subpoenaing of newsmen to testify concerning
information obtained by them in their professional capacities causes
their confidential news sources to become terrified of disclosure and
consequently to shut up; that even the mere appearance of a newsman
in secret grand jury proceedings, where what he has told cannot be
* Walter Cronkite, Brief for Appellant at 20, Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d
1081 (9th Cir. 1970).
I. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 539 (1965). See, e.g., New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
2. Application of Caldwell, 311 F. Supp. 358, (N.D. Cal. 1970). The importance of
the newsmen's ability to receive and protect confidential information was manifested in a
survey conducted by James A. Guest and Alan L. Stanzler, appended to The
Constitutional Argument For Newsmen Concealing Their Sources, 64 Nw. L. REv. 18,
57-61 (1969), indicating that a substantial number of newspaper stories are based on
information secured in a confidential setting.
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known, destroys his credibility, ruptures his confidential associations,
and thereby irreparably damages his ability to function effectively as a
newsman; and that the resulting loss of confidence spreads rapidly and
widely to other newsmen, thus critically impairing the newsgathering
capacities of the media and impoverishing the fund of public
information and understanding.3
Despite this evidence that the newsman's ability to receive and
keep information in confidence is the foundation of the public's ability
to be informed on public issues from extremist politics to local
corruption; newsmen, as a general rule, must receive and protect such
confidential evidence at their peril. The newsman must choose between
revealing his confidential source or information, thereby risking a loss
of these sources or refusing to reveal his confidential information,
which often results in a contempt citation and subsequent jail sentence.4
The newsmen argue that the courts should interpret the first
amendment 5 as giving the newsman a constitutional privilege to conceal
confidential sources and information in order to assure the free flow of
news. For years newsmen tried to convince courts and legislatures to
recognize a common law privilege for newsmen to conceal confidential
sources and information. This argument centered upon the public
interest in the free flow of news and vague analogies to recognized
common law privileges. Although sixteen state legislatures have
3. Brief for Appellant at 17, Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir.
1970). It should be noted that these effects are particularly severe in the cases of newsmen
covering militant and dissident political groups which are naturally distrustful, and
fearful of government suppression.
4. An article in 61 MICH. L. REv 184 (1962) has gone so far as to suggest that a
privilege for newsmen is unnecessary because newsmen, abiding by their professional
code of ethics, invariably refuse, as a practical matter, to disclose the identity of
confidential sources of information, regardless of judicial compulsion. Therefore,
journalistic obstinacy supplants the need for constitutional or statutory protections to
preve
t restraints on the flow of news from confidential sources to the public, and
informants are adequately protected thereby.
At best, this argument indicates a misconception of the problem presented because it
is not in the best interests of society to depend for protection of an important
constitutional guarantee (freedom of the press) on the fact that people are willing to go to
jail to protect this interest.
5. "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom . . . of the press
.... " U.S. CONST. Amend I. It has long been recognized that these constitutional
prohibitions extend to the exercise of the judicial powers. See, e.g., Blair v. United States,
250 U.S. 273 (1919).
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adopted the privilege in statute form, no court has recognized a
common law privilege for newsmen.6
However in 1958, newsmen began to shift their attack and argued
that the first amendment should be interpreted to give them a
constitutional privilege to conceal confidential information and sources
in order to protect the free flow of news. 7 Up to this point, at least nine
courts have considered the constitutional question. These include the
Supreme Courts of Colorado,8 Hawaii,' Pennsylvania," Oregon,"
Massachusetts, 2 Wisconsin, 13 as well as an Army General Court
Martial" and the Courts of Appeals for the Second'" and Ninth
Circuits. 6 Of these nine decisions, six have denied the privilege. 7 These
courts generally found a strong public policy in favor of compulsory
testimony by witnesses and little, if any, impairment of the free flow of
news.' 8 Two other cases indicated an acceptance of the general
6. See 7 A.L.R. 3rd 591 (1966) for a treatment of the cases rejecting such a privilege.
The major case in this country rejecting the common law privilege is People ex rel.
Mooney v. Sheriff of New York County, 269 N.Y. 291, 199 N.E. 415 (1936).
7. Most of the early cases presenting the constitutional question dealt merely with
protecting the identity of confidential sources, but recently, newsmen have sought
constitutional protection for information given in confidence (notes and tapes of
interviews, photographs, etc.).
8. Murphy v. Colorado, 365 U.S. 843 (1961) (cert. denied).
9. In re Goodfader's Appeal, 45 Hawaii 317, 367 P.2d 472 (1961).
10. In reTaylor, 412 Pa. 32, 193 A.2d 181 (1963).
11. State v. Buchanan, 250 Ore. 244, 436 P.2d 729, cert. denied, 392 U.S. 905
(1968).
12. In re Pappas, 266 N.E.2d 297 (Mass. 1971).
13. State v. Knops, 39 U.S.L.W. 2445 (Wis. Feb. 2, 1971).
14. United States v. Calley, 39 U.S.L.W. 2463 (Army General Court-Martial 5th
Jud. Cir. Jan. 20, 1971).
15. Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958).
16. Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970).
17. Murphy v. Colorado, 365 U.S. 843 (1961) (cert. denied); In re Goodfadcr's
Appeal, 45 Hawaii 317, 367 P.2d 472 (1961). In re Taylor, 412 Pa. 32, 193 A.2d 181
(1963); State v. Buchanan, 250 Ore. 244,436 P.2d 729, cert. denied, 392 U.S. 905 (1968);
In re Pappas, 266 N.E.2d (Mass. 1971); United States v. Calley 29 U.S.L.W. 2463
(Army General Court-Martial 5th Jud. Cir. Jan. 20, 197 1).
18. It should be noted that a further reason used by the court in State v. Buchanan,
250 Ore. 244,436 P.2d 729 (1968), to deny the first amendment claim was the idea that
[I]t would be difficult to rationalize a rule that would create special
constitutional rights for those possessing credentials as newsgatherers
which would not conflict with the equal-privileges and equal protection
concepts also found in the Constitution.
Id. at 248-49, 436 P.2d at 731. The court's use of the equal protection argument here is
"unusual and inappropriate since presumabl the requisite state action would consist of
[Vol. 23
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relevance of the first amendment in this area but required the newsmen
to testify because of an overriding need for the specific testimony."9 The
only case which has recognized the privilege and allowed its use is
Caldwell v. United States,20 which in contrast to Garland and Knops,
failed to find any compelling national interest for testimony of the sort
specified. The extent of this conflict between the desire of newsmen to
protect their confidential sources and the desire of governmental
authorities to obtain facts of criminal conduct or civil misconduct is
emphasized by the effort which is being made by the Department of
Justice to establish guidelines for the issuing of subpoenas, which will
allow both groups to fulfill their duties to the community at large.
2'
II. BACKGROUND
The issue of the newsman's privilege usually arises in four
situations: (1) where the newsman has written and his paper has
published an article exposing illegal activity or dealing with the
activities of militant or dissident political groups and a district attorney
or attorney general subpoenas him to appear before a grand jury to
divulge names or information so that the government can investigate
the activity and prosecute any criminal violators; (2) where statements
used by the newsman are relevent to a civil case and he is subpoenaed to
testify in behalf of one of the litigants; (3) where either the prosecutor
or the defendant seeks the newsman's testimony in a criminal trial of a
third person (other than the informant); and (4) where a legislative
committee wishes to question the newsman concerning articles or
information related to governmental activity.22 With respect to all of
these situations the newsman may plead that the information was
received in confidence and he cannot divulge it because to do so would
judicial enforcement of a constitutional privilege. The Supreme Court has never invoked
equal protection where the supposed discriminatory act was protected by another
constitutional clause. The specific first amendment right of freedom of the press seems to
answer any challenge based on fourteenth amendment rights. Guest and Stanzler, The
Constitutional Argument For Newsmen Concealing Their Sources, 64 Nw. L. REv. 18,
41 (1969).
19. Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958);
State v. Knops, 39 U.S.L.W. 2445 (Wis. Feb. 2, 1971).
20. 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970).
21. See Address by Attorney General Mitchell, American Bar Association Annual
Meeting, August 10, 1970.
22. Guest and Stanzler, The Constitutional Argument for Newsmen Concealing
Their Sources, 64 Nw. L. REV. 19, 20 (1969).
19711 NOTES
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destroy his credibility, rupture his confidential associations, and
thereby irreparably damage his ability to function professionally.
It has been noted earlier that there is no common law privilege for
a newsman to conceal his sources of information or the information
itself.2? Sixteen states, in varying degrees, grant the newsman a privilege
to conceal his sources.?' As newsmen began to realize that adequate
protection was not available in the courts under common law doctrine
or through significant legislation, they turned to the first amendment,
encouraged by the broad interpretation given it by the Supreme
Court.?
In 1958 Judy Garland brought an action against the Columbia
Broadcasting System (CBS), alleging breach of contract and
defamation. The alleged defamatory statements were printed in an
article by Marie Torre in the New York Herald Tribune and were
attributed to a CBS "network executive." Miss Torre refused to reveal
the identity of her source on deposition and upon the order of the
District Court, this refusal resulting in a criminal contempt citation.
On appeal to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, Mr. Justice
Stewart, sitting as a Circuit Judge in Garland v. Torre,26 "accepted at
the ouset the hypothesis that compulsory disclosure of a journalist's
confidential sources of information may entail an abridgment of press
freedom by imposing some limitation upon the availability of news."
2
However, he noted that freedom of the press is not absolute, a fact
requiring a determination of "whether the interest to be served by
23. See note 6 supra and 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2286 (MeNaughton rev.
1961).
24. ALA. CODE RECOMPILED tit. 7, § 370 (1960); ALAS. COMp. LAWS
ANN. §§ 09.75.150, 160 (Supp. 1970); ARIz. NEV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2237 (Supp.
1969); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-917 (1964); CAL. EviD. CODE ANN. § 1070 (West 1968);
IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-1733 (1968); Ky. REV. STAT. § 421.100 (1970); LA. REV.
STAT. §§ 45:1451-59 (Cum. Supp. 1969); MD. ANN. CODE Art. 35 § 2 (1965); Mici.
STAT. ANN. § 28-945(1) (1954); Mor. REv. CODES ANN. tit. 93 ch. 601-2 (1964); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-21, -29 (Supp. 1969); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 20-1-12.1 (Supp.
1970); N.Y. CIVIL RIGHTS LAW § 79-h (1970); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2739.12
(1964); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 330 (1958).
It should be noted however that a number of legislatures, most notably the United
States Congress on several occasions, have considered and rejected such statutes.
25. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254 (1964); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945); Thornhill v. Alabama,
310 U.S. 88 (1940).
26. 259 F.2d 545 (1958).
27. Id. at 548.
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compelling the testimony in the present case justifies some impairment
of this First Amendment freedom."8 In holding that in this case the
Constitution conferred no right to refuse to answer, Stewart held:
we are not dealing here with the use of the judicial process to force
a wholesale disclosure of a newspaper's confidential sources of
news, nor with a case where the identity of the news source is of
doubtful relevance or materiality. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S.
449 (1958). The question asked of the appellant went to the heart
of the plaintiff's claim32
The court here seemed to accept the idea of a limited constitutional
privilege for the newsman but found that the plaintiff in this case had
shown an overriding need for the testimony."0 The Supreme Court
denied certiorari and Miss Torre went to jail for fourteen days.
In 1961, the Supreme Court of Hawaii considered and rejected a
newman's argument in favor of a constitutional privilege. The plaintiff,
who requested that the newsman reveal his source, had instituted an
action against the members of the Honolulu Civil Service Commission
seeking reinstatement as a member of the Commission, alleging that
her ouster was arbitrary and illegal. The newsman, Goodfader, had
attended the ouster meeting because he had received confidential
information that an attempt to fire her was being considered. The
newsman refused under court order to reveal the identity of his source
and was held in contempt. The Supreme Court of Hawaii relied heavily
on the Garland case in rejecting the privilege but there was no evidence
that the identity of the source went to the heart of the plaintiff's claim.
A further case involved Annette Buchanan, a writer for a student
newspaper, who wrote an article concerning the use of marijuana. She
had promised several marijuana users that if she was permitted to
28. Id.
29. Id. at 549-50. In another portion of the opinion, Stewart noted that "[i]f an
additional first amendment liberty-the freedom of the press-is here involved, we do not
hesitate to conclude that it too must give place under the Constitution to a paramount
public interest in the fair administration of justice." 259 F.2d at 549.
This statement has led a number of authorities, including the Supreme Court of
Hawaii in In re Goodfader's Appeal, 45 Hawaii 317, 367 P.2d 472 (1961), to conclude
that Garland rejected completely a first amendment privilege for newsmen. However, a
complete reading of the decision does not justify that conclusion. See Caldwell v. United
States, 434 F.2d 1081, 1086 n.6 (1970).
30. A strong dissent by Judge Mizuha dealt with this important distinction and
noted that "[hlere the order which compelled disclosure of the confidential news source
was of doubtful relevance or materiality." 367 P.2d at 497.
1971] NOTES
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interview them for publication, their names would not be revealed
under any circumstances. Subsequently, she refused to reveal the
identity of her sources to a grand jury investigating the use of
marijuana. The Supreme Court of Oregon, in State v. Buchanan,31
refused to recognize a newsman's privilege without elaboration as to
their reasoning.
The most recent case to deny the existence of a constitutional
privilege was In re Pappas,32 decided by the Massachusetts Surpeme
Judicial Court. The newsman was covering a riot in New Bedford and
wanted to attend a Black Panther news conference. The Black
Panthers, who had barricaded a store which was used as their
headquarters, allowed him to enter on the condition that he not report
anything he heard or saw inside the store except a police raid which
never occurred. Pappas appeared before the grand jury, under
subpoena, but refused to answer certain questions about what he heard
and saw in the Black Panther headquarters. The court denied his
assertion of constitutional privilege and rejected the Caldwell case, a
discussion of which follows, as having disregarded
important interests of the Federal government and the several
states in enforcement of the criminal law for the benefit of the
general public . . . [and] as having unnecessarily (expressed], in
terms of newly discovered constitutional absolutes, interests of the
news media, which (so far as reasonably requiring protection) may
be guarded by sound judicial discretion and administration.
3
The only case to recognize and apply a constitutional privilege for
newsmen is Caldwell v. United States,4 recently decided by the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals. Caldwell, a news reporter for the New York
Times, was a specialist in the reporting of news concerning the Black
Panther Party. He was subpoenaed before a federal grand jury
investigating the Black Panthers and the possibility that the Panthers
were engaged in criminal activities contrary to federal law. The court of
appeals affirmed a district court grant of privilege as to certain matters
until such time as the government could demonstrate a compelling and
31. 250 Ore. 244, 436 P.2d 729 (1968).
32. 266 N.E.2d 297 (Mass. 1971).
33. 266 N.E.2d at 302.
34. 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970). It should be noted that the Pappas case and the
Caldwell case differ from the cases earlier discussed because Pappas and Caldwell were
trying to protect not only their sources of information but also the very information that
they had gathered but may not have publishedl.
[Vol. 23
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overriding national interest in requiring Caldwell's testimony which
could not be served by any alternative means." Despite the seeming
broad nature of these holdings, the court was careful to indicate that its
rule was a narrow one, noting that
[iut is not every news source that is as sensitive as the Black
Panther Party has been shown to be respecting the performance of
the "establishment" press or the extent to which that performance
is open to view. It is not every reporter who so uniquely enjoys the
trust and the confidence of his sensitive news source.31
In all of the cases dealing with the newsman's assertion of privilege to
refrain from revealing confidential information or sources the courts
have recognized two opposing interests: "the need to compel reluctant
witnesses to testify in order to assure the orderly and effective operation
of the judicial system on the one hand and the interest in the free flow of
news reflected in the first amendment on the other." 37
III. THE CITIZEN'S DUTY To TESTIFY
It has long been settled that "the giving of testimony and the
attendance upon court or grand jury in order to testify are public duties
which every person within the jurisdiction of the government is bound
to perform upon being properly summoned, ' 38 unless specifically
privileged or exempted.39 The duty to testify is basic to the
administration of our system of justice. Wigmore expresses the
significance of this principle as follows:
35. The court of appeals reversed the portion of the district court's order which
required Caldwell to appear before the grand jury to answer questions not privileged.
This decision was based on the fact that the secrecy surrounding grand jury testimony
necessarily introduces uncertainty in the minds of those who fear betrayal of their
confidences. The court noted that if there was nothing to which Caldwell could testify
that was not already public or that was not protected by the district court's order, the
only result of his appearance before the grand jury would be to destroy his capacity as a
news gatherer. Therefore, the court held that
where it has been shown that the public's First Amendment right to be
informed would be jeopardized by requiring a journalist to submit to secret
Grand Jury interrogation, the Government must respond by
demonstrating a compelling need for the witness's presence before judicial
process properly can issue to require attendance.
434 F.2d at 1089.
36. 434 F.2d at 1090.
37. Guest and Stanzler, The Constitutional Argument for Newsmen Concealing
Their Sources, 64 Nw. L. Rav. 18, 24 (1969).
38. Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 281 (1919).
39. 8 J. VIGMOR, EVIDENCE § 2190-92 (McNaughton rev. 1961). See Blackmer v.
I lnited State-s. 284 U.S. 421. 438 (1932).
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For more than three centuries it has now been recognized as a
fundamental maxim that the public . . . has a right to every
man's evidence. When we come to examine the various claims of
exemption, we start with the primary assumption that there is a
general duty to give what testimony one is capable of giving and
that any exemptions which may exist are distinctly exceptional,
being so many derogations from apositive general rule."0
There also is little doubt that the courts' use of their power to
compel witnesses to testify and to cite them for contempt if they refuse
does not violate the witness' first amendment freedom of speech."
Although the sixth amendment" gives the accused in a criminal
prosecution power to compel witnesses to testify in his favor, there is
some question as to whether or not a civil litigant has a constitutional
right to compel testimony. This latter right is an English common law
principle adopted by the American judicial system.43 However, whether
or not the civil litigant has a constitutional right to compulsory
testimony does not seem important because of the strong tradition of
compulsory testimony accepted by our courts."'
Although the law recognizes some exceptions to the duty to testify,
these exceptions are few"5 and courts and legislatures are reluctant to
add to the number. Even where a recognized privilege does exist, the
courts often say that privileges, since they inhibit the search for the
truth, should be strictly construed. 6 As champion of those who desire
to see the use of the privilege strictly limited, Wigmore expresses that
position as follows:
There must be good reason plainly shown, for their existence
... .The trend of the day, [however]' is to expand them as if they
40. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2192 (McNaughton rev. 1961). See United States
v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323 (1950).
41. See Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273 (1919). See also Blackmer v. United
States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932).
42. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor .... ." U.S. CONST. Amend.
VI.
43. Guest and Stanzler, The Constitutional Argument For Newsmen Concealing
Their Sources, 64 Nw. L. REv. 18, 25 (1969), citing 8 J. WiGmORE, EVIDENCE § 2192
(McNaughton rev. 1961). However WIGMORE, § 2191 has been cited for the idea that
the due process clause grants compulsory process to both the civil and criminal party.
44. See Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932); Blair v. United States, 250
U.S. 273 (1919).
45. A few of the major privileges include the relationship between husband and wife,
attorney and client, and doctor and patient..
46. See Hyman v. Grant, 102 Tex. 50, 112 S.W. 1042 (1908). (attorney-client).
[Vol. 23
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were large and fundamental principles, worthy of pursuit in the
remotest analogies. This attitude is an unwholesome one. The
investigation of truth and the enforcement of testimonial duty
demand the restriction; not the expansion of the privileges. They
should be recognized only within the narrowest limits required by
principle. Every step beyond these limits helps to provide, without
any real necessity, an obstacle to the administration of justice.4
7
As was noted earlier, the idea of a common law newsman's
privilege to conceal his sources or information was consistently rejected
by the courts." Most have held that the relationship between a
newsman and his confidential source does not fulfill Wigmore's four
fundamental conditions necessary to establish a privilege against
compulsory testimony. These four conditions are:
1. The communications must originate in a confidence that they
will not be disclosed,
2. The element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and
satisfactory maintenance of the relations between the parties,
3. The relation must be one which in the opinion of the
community ought to be sedulously fostered,
4. The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of
the communications must be greater than the benefit thereby
gained for the correct disposal of the litigation.4
9
The argument used by these courts that the conditions are not met
with respect to concealing the source of the information goes as
follows: (1) The rommunication itself is not confidential. It is given in
order to be published to the community; (2) the confidentiality of the
communication is not essential to the relationship between the parties;
(3) the community has no interest in protecting the newsman
-confidential informant relationship for its own sake; (4) there is no
injury caused by the disclosure of the communications because the
communications are intended to be disclosed; only the source of the
information remains undisclosed.5
47. 8 J. WIGMORE, EvIDENCE § 2192 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
48. People ex rel. Mooney v. Sheriff of New York County, 269 N.Y. 291, 199 N.E.
415 (1936). See 7 A.L.R.3d 591 (1966) and In re Goodfader's Appeal, 45 Hawaii 317,
367 P.2d 472 (1961) for a comprehensive list of those cases which have refused to
recognize a common law privilege for newsmen.
49. 8 J. WIGMIORE, EvIDENCE § 2285 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
50. There is room for discussion as to the validity of argument #3 because the
"opinion of the community" cannot be determined with exactitude. In those states which
have adopted the privilege, the "opinion of the community" would seem to be that the
19713
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The arguments in favor of the privilege are that the newsman only
wants to conceal the identity of the source not the information received
from the source and that the mere identity of the source does not fit the
notion of "communication" ascertained in Wigmore's four conditions.
Even if the identity of the informant is part of the communication,
Wigmore's four conditions would still seem to be satisfied: (I) The
name was communicated in a confidence that it would not be disclosed;
(2) the relationship requires the confidentiality because the informant
would not make public his information unless guaranteed anonymity;
(3) the community desires to foster the relationship because of its
interest in the free flow of news; (4) the injury to the relation and
consequent free flow of news, in some instances, outweighs the interest
in the correct disposal of the litigation.'
The case for a common law privilege where the newsman desires to
conceal not only the source of the information but also the unpublished
information in his possession is more difficult because the information
was clearly given for publication. However more recent cases, such as
Caldwell v. United States,5 2 in which newsmen have attempted to
conceal information which they received, reliance has been placed on
the first amendment rather than the existence of a common law
privilege.
Desptie the plausibility of the argument that the newsman has a
common law privilege to conceal his source of information, there seems
to be little hope that a court would ever accept the argument. This
rejection, however, has little effect upon the ultimate constitutional
question. Once into the area of constitutional protection, we are not
concerned with an exception to compulsory testimony. Therefore,
Wigmore's four fundamental conditions for establishing a privilege are
no longer relevant because as indicated by the Supreme Court, conduct
tending to restrain the free flow of news is unconstitutional unless
relationship is one that ought to be sedulously fostered. On the other side of this
argument is the fact that the privilege has not gained much acceptance either at common
law or in the United States.
Regardless of this uncertainty, Wigmore requires that all four conditions be present
before a privilege should be recognized. The absence of one or more of them serves to
explain why certain privileges have failed to obtain the recognition demanded for them.
51. Guest and Stanzler, The Constitutional Argument For Newsmen Concealing
Their Sources, 64 Nw. L. REv. 18,27 (1969).
52. 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970).
[Vol. 23
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strongly justified.53 Under the common law the presumpti6n was
against any privilege. However, instead of trying to justify an exception
because of a constitutional interest "a proper analysis should start with
the constitutional presumption of a privilege and try to justify its denial
because of a common law interest in compulsory testimony."54 A
further reason for treating the constitutional question differently from
the common law question is the fact that the newsman-informant
relationship differs greatly from the typical common law privilege. In
the first place the relationship itself is constitutionally irrelevant except
insofar as it protects the public's first amendment right to a "free and
untrammelled press." Secondly, the identity of the informant here is
confidential; whereas usually both parties are known. Thirdly, the
communication itself is disclosed; whereas in the usual privilege the
communication is confidential. Fourthly, the privilege belongs to the
newsman and he can waive it without the permission of the informant,
whereas the privilege normally belongs to the person making the
communication. Finally, the newsman may assert the privilege in
connection with any information furnished him whether confidential or
not; whereas in the normal privilege the privilege may be asserted with
respect to confidential communications only.55 Therefore, because of
different approaches between the constitutional question and the
common law question, any further reference to Wigmore's conditions
in connection with the constitutional question would be meaningless.
IV. THE CASE FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVILEGE
Any analysis such as this must proceed from a recognition that a
free press plays a central role in helping to maintain the other
institutions and attitudes of a free society. Recognition of this
fundamental mission appears in almost every Supreme Court decision
dealing with the freedom of the press. In Grosjean v. American Press
Co.," the Court invalidated a special tax on newspapers, noting that an
abridgement on freedom of the press "goes to the heart of the natural
right of the members of an organized society, united for their common
good, to impart and acquire information about their common
53. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
54. Guest and Stanzler, The Constitutional Argument For Newsmen Concealing
Their Sources, 64 Nw. L. REv. 18, 28 (1969).
55. STAFF OF SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG., 2D SEss., THE
NEWSMAN'S PRIvILEGE (Comm. Print 1966).
56. 297 U.S. 233 (1966).
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interest. ' 57 The Court, in Associated Press v. United States," stated
"that [the first] amendment rests on the assumption that the widest
possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic
sources is essential to the welfare of the public.... ."These decisions
and many others reflect the primacy of the guarantee of freedom of the
press and thereby illuminate the constitutional framework within which
inhibitions on the press must be evaluated.
To talk in terms of the first amendment ° is not to quarrel with the
general proposition "that the giving of testimony and the attendance
upon court or grand jury in order to testify are public duties which
every person within the jurisdiction of the government is bound to
perform upon being properly summoned."' 6 However, like every other
legal proposition, this one is subject to exceptions and limitations (as
expressly recognized in the authorities that establish the proposition);62
and like every other governmental power, the power of a court or grand
jury to compel the appearance of witnesses is limited by the first
amendment.
The power of compulsory process of the legislative investigating
committee is surely no less important than that of a court or grand
jury. The Supreme Court has often recognized the legislature's need
and authority "through its own process, to compel a private individual
to appear before it or one of its committees and give testimony needed
to enable it efficiently to exercise a legislative function belonging to it
57. Id. at 243.
58. 326 U.S. i (1945).
59. Id. at 20. See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 539 (1965), where the Court said
"[t]he free press has been a mighty catalyst in awakening public interest in governmental
affairs, exposing corruption among public officers and employees and generally
informing the citizenry of public events and occurrences. .. "
60. "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom . . . of the press
.... " U.S. CONST. Amend. I.
61. Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 281 (1919) (emphasis added). See United
States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950).
62. Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273 (1919):
The duty, so onerous at times, yet so necessary to the administration
of justice according to the forms and modes established in our system of
government . . . is subject to mitigation in exceptional circumstances;
there is a constitutional exemption from being compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against oneself. . . ; some confidential matters are
shielded from considerations of policy, and perhaps in other cases for
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under the Constitution;" yet this power has repeatedly been subjected
to first amendment limitation.
64
However, the first amendment is not absolute and the protection is
subject to compromise, if there are strong policy reasons for
restriction; 5 but such restraints have been accepted by the Supreme
Court only with great reluctance."
In considei.ag the constitutional question, the first area of inquiry
must be to determine whether the process of newsgathering is within the
first amendment. Although the courts in Garland and Goodfader
expressed doubts about this,6 7 the better view seems to be that freedom
of the press to gather the news 8 is the factual and constitutional
precondition of freedom of the press to disseminate the news 9 and the
freedom of the public to receive it. 0 This, very simply, is what the first
amendment is all about.
7'
63. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 160 (1927). See also United States v.
Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1953); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 609 (1959).
64. See, e.g., DeGregory v. Attorney General of New Hampshire, 383 U.S. 825
(1966). See also Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957), where the Court said:
The Bill of Rights is applicable to investigations as to all forms of
governmental action. Witnesses cannot be compelled to give evidence
against themselves. They cannot be subjected to unreasonable search and
seizure. Nor can the First Amendment freedoms of speech, press, ... or
political belief and association be abridged.
Id. at 188.
65. Obscenity and libel are not protected by the first amendment. Ginzburg v.
United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
66. See, e.g., the "clear and present danger" test, established in Schenk v. United
States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) and later interpretations such as Dennis v. United States, 341
U.S. 494 (1951). See also, Guest and Stanzler, The Constitutional Argument for
Newsmen Concealing Their Sources, 64 Nw. L. REV. 18, 30-31 (1969).
67. Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910
(1958); In re Goodfader's Appeal, 45, Hawaii 317, 329, 367 P.2d 472, 479 (1961).
68. Associated Press v. KVOS, 80 F.2d 575, 581 (9th Cir. 1935), rev'd on other
grounds, 299 U.S. 269 (1936).
69. See, e.g., Beckley Newspapers Corp. v. Hanks, 389 U.S. 81 (1967); Talley v.
California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
70. See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969); Lamont v. Postmaster
General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943).
71. The predominant purpose of the . . . [first amendment] was to
preserve an untrammeled press as a vital source of public information. The
newspapers, magazines and other journals of the country, it is safe to say,
have shed and continue to shed more light on the public and business
affairs of the nation than any other instrumentality of publicity; and since
informed public opinion is the most potent of all restraints upon
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As noted, the Supreme Court, subsequent to Garland and
Goodfader, held that the first amendment did protect the right to
receive information. 72 In Stanley v. Georgia,72 while searching Stanley's
home for evidence of bookmaking activity, federal and state agents
found three reels of eight-millimeter film, which the agents felt were
obscene. He was convicted, under Georgia law," of knowingly having
possession of obscene matter. The Supreme Court held that the first
and fourteenth amendments prohibited making mere private possession
of obscene material a crime. Mr. Justice Marshall, speaking for the
Court said that:
It is now well established that the Constitution protects the
right to receive information and ideas. . . . This right to receive
information and ideas, regardless of their social worth, see
Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510, 68 S. Ct. 665, 667, 92 L.
Ed. 840 (1948), is fundamental to our free society.75
This traditional right, expressed in terms of the public's right to know,
requires as a necessary corollary that the news media have the right to
gather information because the public's right to know is directly
dependent upon the media's ability to receive information."
However, this is not to say that the right to gather news is
absolute. Some restraint is necessary and reasonable. In Estes v.
Texas,7r the Court held that the trial court erred in not barring
television transmission of the courtroom proceedings. Despite some
attempts, no analogy can properly be drawn between barring reporters
from the courtroom to assure fair trials and compelling them to reveal
their confidential sources and information to assure fair trials. In the
first situation the harm done by the gathering is immediate because the
trial is upset by extraneous factors which may influence the court and
misgovernment, the suppression or abridgment of the publicity afforded by
a free press cannot be regarded otherwise than with grave concern.
Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936). See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385
U.S. 374 (1967); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,269 (1964).
72. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381
U.S. 301 (1965).
73. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
74. GA. CODE ANN. § 26-6301 (Supp. 1968).
75. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969).
76. "In other words, the State may not, consistently with the spirit of the first
amendment, contract the spectrum of available knowledge." Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965).
77. 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
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Noms
jury. But when confidential information and sources are involved, no
immediate harm is caused by the newsman talking to informants and
then publishing the information."
A further argument in favor of the constitutional privilege can be
found in the fact that the Supreme Court has long recognized the
important role played by the need for associational privacy and
anonymity in the protection of first amendment freedoms. 79 In
NAACP v. Alabama,s0 the Court held that a state statute requiring the
NAACP to reveal its members violated rights of freedom of speech and
assembly, reasoning that such disclosure of membership might
discourage persons from joining and exercising their right to associate
freely. Similar logic applies to the case of the newsman's confidential
sources because if he were required to reveal such confidential
information, this not only would discourage him from divulging the
information to the detriment of the free flow of news but also would
discourage dissident groups from associating with newsmen and
communicating their views.81
With the above as background, one need only look to the concept
of the informer's privilege in the criminal law to find a precise factual
analogy. 2 Government attorneys in an effort to resist defense attempts
to secure the identity of the informers have frequently maintained that
compelling such disclosure would dry up sources of necessary
information. The Supreme Court recognized the need for such a
privilege," and has noted that "the purpose of the [informer's] privilege
is the furtherance and protection of the public interest in effective law
78. Guest and Stanzler, The Constitutional Argument for Newsmen Concealing
Their Sources, 64 Nw. L. REv. 18, 33 (1969).
79. See, e.g., Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 475 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357
U.S. 449 (1958); see generally, Comment, The Constitutional Right to Anonymity, Free
Speech, Disclosure and the Devil, 70 YALE L.J. 1084 (1961).
80. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
81. In NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), the Court spoke of "... the
vital relationship between freedom to associate and privacy in one's associations ....
[l]nviolability of privacy in group associations may in many circumstances be
indispensible to preservation of freedom of association particularly when a group
espouses dissident beliefs." Id. at 462.
82. Wigmore recognized the need for the governmental informer privilege and noted
that "its soundness cannot be questioned." 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2374(0
(McNaughton rev. 1961). He observes that disclosure from informers would be
discouraged if their identities were disclosed.
83. McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 311-12 (1967); Scher v. United States, 305
U.S. 251, 254 (1938).
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enforcement."" 4 It is readily apparent how the arguments for
concealing the identity of the governmental informer also apply in the
case of the newsman's attempt to conceal the identity of his
confidential source or to conceal information given in confidence.
A final argument in favor of the constitutional privilege can be
found in the broad interpretation given to the first amendment by such
cases as New York Times Co. v. Sullivan"' and Time, Inc. v. Hill."0 In
New York Times Co., the Court held that a person could libel a public
official only if the false information were published with actual malice.
This had the effect of limiting the rights of the public official because of
the importance placed on the first amendment freedom of the press.
This case was broadened by Time, Inc. v. Hill where a family was
denied recovery, despite suffering injury to its reputation, because of
the danger to the free flow of news. The suit in Time, Inc. v. Hill
originated after Life had carried a story about a play called The
Desperate Hours. The story was inspired by the actual experiences of
the Hill family while being held hostage in their suburban home by
three escaped convicts. However, unlike the Hill's experience,8 the
family in the play suffer violence at the hands of the convicts, the father
and son are beaten and the daughter is subjected to verbal sexual
insults. The Life article gave the impression that the play accurately
portrayed the experiences of the Hill family. 7
In denying recovery to the Hill family despite the errors in the
story, the Supreme Court first held that the article should be
characterized as dissemination of news because it supplied legitimate
84. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 59 (1957).
85. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
86. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
87. In an interview following their ordeal, Mr. Hill stressed the fact that the convicts
had treated the family courteously and had released them unharmed.
88. The guarantees for speech and press are not the preserve of political
expression or comment upon public affairs, essential as those are to
healthy government. One need only pick up any newspaper or magazine to
comprehend the vast range of published matter which exposes persons to
public view, both private citizens and public officials. Exposure of the self
to others in varying degrees is a concomitant of life in a civilized
community . . . . Freedom of discussion, if it would fulfill its historic
function in this nation, must embrace all issues about which information is
needed or appropriate to enable the members of society to cope with the
exigencies of their period.
Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967).
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newsworthy information in which the public had or might have a
proper interest." The Court further noted that:
[W]e create a grave risk of serious impairment of the
indispensible service of a free press in a free society if we saddle the
press with the impossible burden of verifying to a certainty the
facts associated in news articles with a person's name, picture or
portrait, particularly as related to nondefamatory matter."
The analogy to be drawn from this case is that any injury caused
to a civil litigant by his inability to force a newsman to reveal his
confidential source of information is justified by a superior interest in
the free flow of news.
Freedom of the press is a constitutional presumption which can be
limited only by a strong showing of another interest (compulsory
testimony). The Supreme Court recognized this in 1941 when it held
that an obstruction of justice sufficient to limit freedom of the press
must be "extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely
high."0
Since freedom of the press and other first amendment rights are
not absolute,9 the Supreme Court has devised a balancing test between
the asserted constitutional protection and the exercise of the
governmental powers. The test has been stated as follows: "Where
First Amendment rights are asserted to bar governmental interrogation
resolution of the issue always involves a balancing by the courts of the
competing private and public interests at stake in the particular
circumstances shown."
92
Most courts which have rejected the newsman's first amendment
privilege have based their decisions on the reasoning that freedom of
the press is important but not absolute. The Supreme Court will allow
limitation of the first amendment where an overriding public interest
can be shown. Even though forced disclosure constitutes some
impairment of freedom of the press, it is not of a degree sufficient to
outweigh the necessity of maintaining the court's fundamental
authority to compel testimony. Therefore, under the balancing test,
there is no newsman's privilege under the first amendment.
89. 385 U.S. at 389.
90. Bridges v. California, 315 U.S. 252, 263 (1941), quoted in In re Goodfader's
Appeal, 45 Hawaii 317, 357, 367 P.2d 472,493 (1961) (dissenting opinion).
91. Konisberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36 (1961).
92. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 126 (1959).
93. In re Goodfader's Appeal, 45 Hawaii 317, 357, 367 P.2d 472,478-80 (1961).
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There seems to be little question that the court in Garland v.
Torre94 properly framed the issue present in all of the first amendment
cases involving newsmen, as follows: "whether the interest to be served
by compelling the testimony of the witness in the present case justifies
some impairment of this first amendment freedom."9 The problem
with this test has been the fact that some courts have started with the
principle of compulsory testimony and then have required justification
of the newsman's privilege. In re Pappas, 6 in denying a constitutional
privilege to the newsman, cited, with approval, the following statement
by Professor Edmund M. Morgan: "Such a privilege suppresses
valuable evidence to which the trier of fact is competent to give its
proper weight. So serious an interference with a rational inquiry can be
justified only by accompanying social benefits of high worth.""7
However, the court in Caldwell v. United States" demonstrated a
proper understanding of the balancing process by noting that in cases
involving conflicts between first amendment interests and legislative
investigatory needs, the Supreme Court requires the sacrifice of first
amendment freedoms only where a compelling need for the particular
testimony in question is shown. 9 What is more important than the
mere statement of the proper question is that this court, unlike the
courts in Goodfader and Pappas, was able to apply the test correctly.
In upholding the privilege, the court cited, with approval, the holding of
the District Court:
When the exercise of the grand jury power of testimonial
compulsion so necessary to the effective functioning of the court
may impinge upon or repress first amendment rights of freedom of
speech, press and association, which centuries of experience have
found to be indispensible to the survival of a free society, such
power shall not be exercised in a manner likely to do so until there
94. 259 F.2d 545 (1958).
95. Id. at 548. See, Brief for Appellant at 57 n. 61, Caldwell v. United States, 434
F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970).
96. 266 N.E.2d 297 (Mass. 1971).
97. Id. at 901, citing Morgan, FORWARD TO ALI MODEL CODE OF EVIDENcE at 7
(1942).
98. 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970).
99. Id. at 1085-86. See. e.g., Degregory v. Attorney General of New Hampshire,
383 U.S. 825 (1966); Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Committee, 372 U.S.
539 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
[Vol. 23
19
Jennings: The Newsman's Privilege and the Constitution
Published by Scholar Commons, 1971
has been a clear showing of a compelling and overriding national
interest that cannot be served by any alternative means."0
A possible explanation for the misstatement of the balancing
requirement by the courts in Pappas and Goodfader might be that still
a majority of the newsman cases have not involved the constitutional
question but rather a common law exception to the rule of compulsory
testimony. In those common law cases, the presumption against
exception was proper. 10
Two other arguments that have been advanced as reasons for
denying a privilege to newsmen are that it would encourage libel and
that it would give a favored position to a business enterprise. The fear
that a constitutional privilege for newsmen will encourage libel
indicates a misconception of the problem. Often the identity of the
source is irrelevant to the proceedings against the publication. In the
ordinary libel case, falling outside of the scope of New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan,' the burden of proof is on the defendant publication to
prove the truth of the story. Therefore, the publication has the option,
to no detriment of the plaintiff, either to reveal the source of the
information as a method of proving "truth" or to protect the source
and risk an adverse judgement if it is unable to prove the truth without
the source. However, a case falling within the Times rule presents a
different issue. In these cases a public official or public figure,'13 suing
for libel, must prove that the allegedly defamatory publication was
both false and made with "actual malice.""' 4 Actual malice is proved if
the plaintiff can show that the defamatory statement was made falsely
or with a reckless disregard for the truth. 05 Proof of actual malice is
very difficult under Supreme Court standards and is usually
accomplished by showing that a publication is "guilty" of "highly
100. "When we come to examine the various claims of exemptions, we start with the
primary assumption that there is a general duty to give what testimony one is capable of
giving and that any exemptions which may exist are distinctly exceptional, being so many
derogations from a positive general rule." 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2192
(McNaughton rev. 1961). See also, United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323 (1950).
101. 434 F.2d at 1086, citing, Application of Caldwell, 311 F. Supp. 358, 360
(1970).
102. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
103. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385
U.S. 374 (1967) where this rule was extended to persons who are newsworthy, whether or
not such newsworthiness is voluntary.
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unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the
standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by
responsible publishers."' 16 The obvious difference between the Times
situation and the ordinary libel case is that in the Times situation the
plaintiff must prove actual malice and this may depend upon showing
that the informant was unreliable and that the publication violated
standard reporting practices by failing to verify the story. There is little
doubt that, under any test devised heretofore, the identity of the source
could be demanded, without violating the first amendment. However,
in order that this not involve wholesale disclosure, a requirement that
the plaintiff prove at least the probable falsity of the story before
requiring disclosure of the source is reasonable in this situation. The
publication would still retain the option to show that it made a good
faith effort to determine the truth of the information in order to show
that it was not guilty of actual malice, regardless of the reliability of the
informer.
The fact that publications are usually intended to be products of
profit-making corporations does not affect the constitutional
question. 07 Opponents of the privilege argue that newsmen are seeking
the constitutional privilege to further their own business purposes and
not for the benefit of the public. 10 However, even though newspapers
are likely to gain financially by publishing confidential information
this would probably be held irrelevant in determining the extent of first
amendment freedoms by the Supreme Court which recently said the
following in Time, Inc. v. Hill:"9
Those guarantees are not for the benefit of the press so much
as for the benefit of all of us. . . .1 That books, newspapers, and
magazines are published and sold for profit does not prevent them
from being a form of expression whose liberty is safeguarded by
the first amendment."
106. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967).
107. See Comment, 61 MICH. L. REv. 184, 188 (1962).
108. See Note, The Right of a Newsman to Refrain From Divulging the Sources of
His Information, 36 VA. L. Rev. 61, 83 (1950); Comment, Confidentiality of News
Sources Under the First Amendment, II STAN. L. Rev. 541, 544 (1959).
109. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
110. Id. at 389.
ii1. Id. at 397.
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V. THE EFFECT OF A REVIVAL OF THE PRIVILEGE ON THE FREE FLOW
OF NEWS
At the present time, a denial of this privilege would likely have a
devastating effect upon the gathering and publication of news. It is
reasonable to assume that confidentiality is necessary to the
maintenance of a relationship with many informers.112 Also potential
sources are likely to be deterred from revealing their information by the
unrestricted use of the subpoena power over newsmen." 3 In addition,
such use of the subpoena will probably keep reporters from gathering
or publishing information that might result in a requirement of
complete disclosure."' If subpoenas and contempt orders are enforced
against newsmen," 5 the press will be unable to uncover criminal
activity and governmental corruption and to report the activities of
dissident political groups because few informants would likely accept
public identification in return for disclosure of their knowledge and
"[a]ll of us will be poorer for this.""'
Although there is no definite evidence that the subpoenaing of
newsmen has these effects, the deterrent effect of subpoenas upon the
willingness of informants to continue talking to newsmen has been
shown by the reaction of militant groups. An example of this resulted
in June, 1969, when reporter Anthony Ripley of the New York Times
112. See a statement by Max Frankel in the New York Times:
In private dealings with persons who figure in the news, reporters
obtain not only on-the-record comments but also confidential judgments
and facts that they then use to appraise the accuracy and meaning of other
men's words and deeds. Without that access and without such confidential
relationships, such important information would have to be gathered by
remote means and much could never be subjected to cross-examination.
New York Times, February 6, 1970, at 40, Col. 4.
113. The relationship [between reporters and such groups as the Black
Panthers] depends upon a trust and confidence that is constantly subject to
re-examination and that depends in turn on actual knowledge of how news
and information imparted have been handled and on the continuing
reassurance that the handling has been discreet.
Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081, 1088 (9th Cir. 1970).
114. "[I]t is not unreasonable to expect journalists everywhere to temper their
reporting so as to reduce the probability that they will be required to submit to
interrogation." Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081, 1086 (9th Cir. 1970).
115. See Brief for Appellant at 15-17, Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th
Cir. 1970) and affidavits accompanying the brief.
116. Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae at 5, Caldwell
v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970).
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was subpoenaed to testify before the House Internal Security
Committee because of stories he had written about the 1968 S.D.S.
national convention. The result was not only the total destruction of his
own relationship with the militants and of his ability to cover militant
activity but also severe impairment of the ability of other Times
reporters to cover the S.D.S., and the exclusion of the entire
"establishment press" from the 1969 S.D.S. convention.' 17 After
Caldwell was subpoenaed on February 2, 1970, similar instances of the
inability of other newsmen to get cooperation from formerly useful
sources were reported."' It should be noted that, in each of the
instances cited, the refusal of previously cooperative news sources to
cooperate was expressly based upon fears generated by the Caldwell
and similar subpoenas.
This problem is compounded when the newsman is required to
appear before a grand jury, not only because of the broad scope of
investigation,"' but also because of the secrecy surrounding the
proceedings. The grand jury is not required to have a factual basis for
commencing an investigation and can pursue rumors which further
investigation may prove groundless. It does not need to have probable
cause to investigate; but rather its function is to determine if probable
cause exists.I" If a newsman is required to appear behind the closed
doors of a federal grand jury armed with such broad powers of inquiry,
his confidential relationships are likely to be destroyed because no one
117. Brief for Appellant at 23-24, Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th
Cir. 1970).
118. The New York Times criminal justice correspondent in New York City found
his sources unwilling to talk about Black Panther activities in the area. In Los Angeles, a
Newsweek reporter who had previously had good relations with the local Panther office
was refused an interview until he was cleared by the Panther Party Headquarters in
Berkeley. He was cleared after giving Newsweek's and his own assurances that they
would resist any subpoena. However, by the time he was finally cleared, the subject of the
interview had left Los Angeles. A final example involved an ABC television team sent to
San Francisco to do a documentary on the Panthers but they were refused permission
first by the Black Panther Party and later by the Oakland Black Caucus in the absence of
assurances that ABC would resist government subpoenas. As a result the proposed
documentary was cancelled. Brief for Appellant at 24-25, Caldwell v. United States, 434
F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970).
119. See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906). "It is impossible to conceive that...
the examination of witnesses must be stopped until a basis is laid by an indictment
formally preferred, when the very object of the examination is to ascertain who shall be
indicted." Id. at 65.
120. See, e.g., Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962); United States v. Winter, 348
F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied. 382 U.S. 955 (1965).
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outside the jury room knows what questions were asked or answered.
The newsman's confidants could not know whether they had been
betrayed.'
Despite the "compelling need" test established by the Caldwell
case,2, severe deterrent effects exist because of the above mentioned
characteristics of the grand jury. The practical effect of requiring
disclosure before a grand jury is that with respect to the reporting of
past actions, newsmen have shown themselves willing to accept
contempt citations and with respect to future actions, there is likely to
be no story because the source is not likely to take the chance of
disclosure. It is difficult to see how the general administration of justice
can be harmed by allowing an absolute privilege for newsmen testifying
before the grand jury.'2 If the newsman failed to publish the story,
there is little likelihood that he could be linked with an occurrence and
called to testify but there would be a disastrous effect upon the free flow
of news. Also, as noted above if the newsman decided to publish the
story while honoring the confidential relationship, it is quite likely that
he would accept the contempt citation and the newsman's "burden
would become the public's burden, for by restricting him the public's
access to reading material would be restricted."' 124 The basic
justification for allowing an absolute right of nondisclosure concerning
newsman-informant communications in all grand jury proceedings is
that it is more important to have the information disseminated to the
public than to require disclosure. Also to cite a newsman for contempt
in a particular case would, in effect, bar newsmen in similar future
121. Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970). The court noted that:
[T]he relationship [between newsman and news sources] depends upon
a trust and confidence that is constantly subject to re-examination and that
depends in turn on actual knowledge of how news and information
imparted have been handled and on continuing reassurance that the
handling has been discreet.
This reassurance disappears when the reporter is called to testify
behind closed doors. The secrecy that surrounds grand jury testimony
necessarily introduces uncertainty in the minds of those who fear betrayal
of their confidences.
Id. at 1088.
122. 434 F.2d 1081, 1086 (9th Cir. 1970).
123. Allowing the newsman an absolute privilege would eliminate the need for them
even to appear because there would be nothing to which he could testify. Therefore
requiring a newsman to respond to a grand jury subpoena would be a meaningless
exercise-one of no benefit to the grand jury.
124. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 153 (1959).
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cases from distributing information which they receive from
confidential sources. This right clearly advances the public interests in
the first amendment and, as shown above, does not significantly impair
the functioning of the grand jury.
A mentioning of those situations where the first amendment
protects a newsman's confidential information and sources obviously
leads to a discussion of when, if ever, a newsman may be compelled to
testify. The newsman's privilege is almost certainly limited by a
defendant's sixth amendment right to compulsory testimony in a
criminal trial.'2 This restriction is not serious because only rarely is the
name of a newsman's confidential source likely to be relevant to the
defense of an accused in a criminal trial. It is also not unreasonable to
require a newsman to testify at a criminal trial concerning the actions
and statements of the defendant informer which relate to the alleged
criminal act. This requirement will probably deter only those informers
who have reason to fear that they will be indicted on information
supplied by sources other than the informer because the source's
identity is not endangered by the mere subpoenaing of the newsman
since an indictment naming the source is obviously a prerequisite to
trial.
The reporter should be willing to testify at a trial (not a closed
grand jury or legislative hearing) in order to authenticate matter
already published. This involves no breach of confidence and should
not deter any potential sources from disclosing their information.
Similar reasoning would apply to eyewitness testimony or film of acts
or events conducted in public without the exception of confidentiality.
A final area of newsman's testimony would be situations where the
publication itself has been validly subject to civil action and the identity
of the source of the material published is essential to the provision of
full redress. As already noted a newsman could be required to testify in
a civil action when his publication is a defendant in a New York Times
Co. action. However, prior to the compelled testimony, the plaintiff
must have shown probable falsity and defamation, and the defendant
must have been unable to prove its lack of actual malice, regardless of
the source's identity. Of course, the plaintiff cannot compel the
125. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor." U.S. CoNsT. Amend. VI.
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testimony if the defendant is willing to accept an adverse judgment as
the price of protecting its confidential sources.
These principles are likely to provide far more effective protection
for first amendment freedoms than any test heretofore devised." 6 The
reason that these tests are not completely effective in protecting first
amendment freedoms is that uncertainty still surrounds the relationship
between reporter and informant because the courts establishing the
tests have offered no guidelines as to what combination of
circumstances will satisfy the criteria of the particular test.
VI. CONCLUSION
The rights protected by the first amendment's freedom of the press
clause are essential to the functioning of a democratic society. Freedom
of the press to gather the news is the factual and constitutional
precondition of freedom of the press to disseminate the news, and
freedom of the public to receive it. The freedoms may be protected only
through the use of confidential relationships which most professional
journalists feel are indispensible to their work of gathering, analyzing
and publishing the news. 12 7 However, compelled disclosure of
information received by a journalist within the scope of such
126. Heart of the Matter Test: In Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2nd Cir. 1958),
cert. denied. 358 U.S. 910 (1958), the court required the newsman to testify because
-[t]he question asked of the appellant [newsman] went to the heart of the plaintiff's
claim." Id. at 550.
The Justice Department has adopted a deviation of this test in its recent guidelines.
Before requesting the Attorney General's authorization for subpoena -It]here should be
sufficient reason to believe that a crime has occurred, from disclosures by non-press
sources. . . .There should be sufficient reason to believe that the information sought is
essential to a successful investigation. . . .The government should have unsuccessfully
attempted to obtain the information from alternative nonpress sources." Address by
Attorney General John N. Mitchell, American Bar Association Annual Meeting, Aug.
10, 1970.
Reasonable Likelihood Test: In In re Goodfader's Appeal, 45 Hawaii 317, 367 P.2d
472 (1961), the court allowed the disclosure of the newsman's information and sources
when there was a reasonable likelihood that the requested information would be relevant
to the inquiry.
Compelling Need Test: In Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970),
the court held that a newsman could not constitutionally be required to testify about
information received by him in confidence until there had been a "clear showing of a
compelling and overriding national interest that cannot be served by any alternative
means." Id. at 1086.
127. See Application of Caldwell, 311 F. Supp. 358 (N.D. Cal. 1970). See also Brief
for Appellant at 15-27, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970).
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confidential relationships seriously jeopardizes those relationships,
thereby impairing the newsman's ability to gather, analyze and publish
the news. Therefore, the public's right to be informed as well as the
rights of those, such as dissident groups to communicate their views
anonymously requires constitutional recognition and implementation
of a newsman's privilege of confidentiality.
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